#### Row Level Security

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Concept View Based Approach Multi-schema Approach

#### Stephen Frost

- Chief Technology Officer @ Crunchy
- Committer
- Major Contributor
- Implemented the roles system in 8.3
- Column-level privileges in 8.4
- Contributions to PL/pgSQL, PostGIS

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Concept View Based Approach Multi-schema Approach

#### What is RLS?

Provide an individual view of the data in the system for each user of the system, while maintaining relational consistency and normalization with a single set of tables.

- Filtering records returned from all queries
- Limit records allowed to be added to a table
- Support filtering and limiting based on user
- Require policies to always be applied
- Default Deny approach

Concept View Based Approach Multi-schema Approach

#### Security Barrier Views

- Build a view over tables to filter records
- Must use security\_barrier option
- Permissions on view independent of table
- Access to tables through view uses permisisions of view owner

Concept View Based Approach Multi-schema Approach

#### WITH CHECK Option

- "Simple" views are automatically updatable
- View could be used to add records not visible to user
- WITH CHECK prevents adding records which can't be seen
- CASCADED vs LOCAL

```
CREATE VIEW myview
WITH (security_barrier, check_option) AS
SELECT * FROM mytable
WHERE myuser = current_user();
```

#### Or

```
CREATE VIEW myview WITH (security_barrier) AS
SELECT * FROM mytable
WHERE myuser = current_user
WITH CHECK OPTION;
```

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Concept View Based Approach Multi-schema Approach

#### Multi-schema Approach

Create a schema and set of tables for each user, use GRANT system for managing access control.

- Difficult to maintain consistency
- Maintenance nightmare for updating table definitions
- Dynamic SQL may be required
- Views or inheiritance for bulk operations
- Partitioning must match authorization requirement

Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

ALTER TABLE ... (ENABLE/DISABLE) ROW LEVEL SECURITY

ENABLE:

- Enables RLS for the table
- Requires all access to be through a policy
- Default-Deny policy
- Excludes superuser and table owner by default

DISABLE:

- Disables RLS for the table
- Policies are no longer used at all
- Does not remove policies on the table

Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

#### SET ROW\_SECURITY ... = (ON/OFF/FORCE)

- ON Normal mode, policies applied as appropriate
- OFF Never applies RLS, will throw an ERROR if necessary
- FORCE RLS applied even for superusers and table owners

Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY

- Policies are table-specific
- Applied for specific commands, or all commands
- Can be for specific roles or all roles
- "default-deny" policy
- USING and WITH CHECK clauses
- WITH CHECK defaults to USING if not specified

```
Command: CREATE POLICY
Description: define a new row-security policy for a table
Syntax:
CREATE POLICY name ON table_name
[ FOR { ALL | SELECT | INSERT | UPDATE | DELETE } ]
[ TO { role_name | PUBLIC } [, ...] ]
[ USING ( expression ) ]
[ WITH CHECK ( check_expression ) ]
```

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY

Example policy creation:

CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable USING (myuser = current\_user);

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY

```
Example policy creation:
```

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable
USING (myuser = current_user);
```

Same:

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable
USING (myuser = current_user)
WITH CHECK (myuser = current_user);
```

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#### Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRA

# CREATE POLICY

```
Example policy creation:
```

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable
USING (myuser = current_user);
```

Same:

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR ALL
USING (myuser = current_user)
WITH CHECK (myuser = current_user);
```

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY

```
Example policy creation:
```

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable
USING (myuser = current_user);
```

Same:

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR ALL TO PUBLIC
USING (myuser = current_user)
WITH CHECK (myuser = current_user);
```

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY FOR SELECT

- Applies only to SELECT queries
- Only allows USING clause

CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR SELECT USING (myuser = current\_user);

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY FOR INSERT

- Applies only to INSERT queries
- Only allows WITH CHECK clause

CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR INSERT WITH CHECK (myuser = current\_user);

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY FOR UPDATE

- Applies only to UPDATE queries
- Alllows both USING and WITH CHECK clauses
- If WITH CHECK is omitted, USING clause will be used

Allows updating records to be hidden from current user:

```
CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR UPDATE
USING (myuser = current_user)
WITH CHECK (true);
```

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# CREATE POLICY FOR DELETE

- Applies only to DELETE queries
- Allows only USING clause

CREATE POLICY p1 ON mytable FOR SELECT USING (myuser = current\_user);

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# ALTER POLICY

- Allows changing policy definitions
- Set of roles the policies applies to can also be changed
- COMMAND for policy is not able to be changed- drop and recreate instead
- Policies can also be renamed

```
Command: ALTER POLICY
Description: change the definition of a row-security policy
Syntax:
ALTER POLICY name ON table_name
    [ RENAME TO new_name ]
    [ TO { role_name | PUBLIC } [, ...] ]
    [ USING ( expression ) ]
    [ WITH CHECK ( check_expression ) ]
```

Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# ALTER POLICY

ALTER POLICY p1 ON mytable USING (myuser = 'r1');

ALTER POLICY p1 ON mytable WITH CHECK (myuser = 'r1');

ALTER POLICY p1 ON mytable T0 r1, r2;

ALTER POLICY p1 ON mytable TO r1, r2 USING (myuser = current\_user) WITH CHECK (myuser = current\_user);

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

# **DROP POLICY**

- Policies can be dropped
- Remember- default deny policy if no policies found

Command: DROP POLICY Description: remove a row-security policy from a table Syntax: DROP POLICY [ IF EXISTS ] name ON table\_name

DROP POLICY p1 ON mytable;

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Enabling Create Alter Drop vs. GRANT

#### POLICY vs. GRANT

#### GRANT system

- Table-level SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE
- Column-level SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE
- All-or-Nothing for rows
- Views traditionally used to limit data
- Everything-or-Error
- POLICY system
  - Table-level row selection
  - Conditional added to queries
  - ERROR for rows added which violate POLICY

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SELECT Filtering Data Modifcation Policies External Policy Systems

#### Simple USING Policy

```
postgres=# \d t1
     Table "public.t1"
 Column | Type | Modifiers
myuser |
         name
mydata | text |
Policies:
   POLICY "p1" EXPRESSION (myuser = "current_user"())
postgres=# table t1;
myuser | mydata
r1
        | r1 data
r2
       | r2 data
         r3 data
r3
(3 rows)
```

SELECT Filtering Data Modifcation Policies External Policy Systems

# Simple USING Policy

• Results filtered based on user

```
postgres=# set role r1;
SET
postgres=> table t1;
myuser | mydata
------r1 | r1 data
(1 row)
```

• If no WITH CHECK clause specified, USING clause is used postgres=> insert into t1 values ('r2','my data'); ERROR: new row violates WITH CHECK OPTION for "t1" DETAIL: Failing row contains (r2, my data).

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SELECT Filtering Data Modifcation Policies External Policy Systems

#### Data Modification Policies

- WITH CHECK used for adding records
- Allows creating records not visible to current user also

SELECT Filtering Data Modifcation Policies External Policy Systems

#### External Policy Systems

- With expressions, any function can be used
- Could call out to extensions for, eg: SELinux

```
postgres=# alter policy p1 on t1
postgres-# using (check_selinux(mydata));
ALTER POLICY
```

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Leak-Proof Functions EXPLAIN Example

#### Leak-Proof Functions

- Only leak-proof functions can be pushed down
- Allows them to be executed before other qualifications
- May be able to more efficiently use indexes
- Only superuser can mark functions leak-proof
- Leak-proof functions must actually be leak proof!

Leak-Proof Functions EXPLAIN Example

#### **EXPLAIN** Example 1

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Leak-Proof Functions EXPLAIN Example

#### **EXPLAIN** Example 2

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Leak-Proof Functions EXPLAIN Example

#### **EXPLAIN** Example 3

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Leak-Proof Functions EXPLAIN Example



Questions?

Stephen Frost Postgres Open 2014

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